Abstract: Given its geographic location and the low adaptive capacity of many of its governments and economic systems, Africa is perhaps the most vulnerable region to climate change. However, model projections of the physical effects of climate change in Africa are highly uncertain, particularly at the national and sub-national spatial scales at which political processes operate. Against this backdrop of great social vulnerability and physical climate uncertainty, political scientists and the policy community have begun to explore the potential security consequences of climate change, describing it as a stressor or a threat multiplier with the potential to contribute to conflict and state failure. Since most of political science is focused on explaining the past rather than predicting the future, scholars have looked to historic data on rainfall variability, disasters, temperature change, refugee movements (all expected effects of climate change) to try to get traction on the causal connections between climate phenomena and security outcomes. Such an approach is rooted in the assumption of stationarity-the concept that the range of climate conditions for a given area occurs within a static envelop of variability that is defined by past extremes. The past, however, may be a poor indicator of how climate risks are likely to interact with social factors to generate disasters, instability, and conflict. Scholars of climate impacts have sought to understand such departures from historic patterns through the use of forecasting and scenario analysis. Using Africa as a regional focus, this paper employs a different approach: vulnerability mapping. This paper presents georeferenced maps of sub-national climate vulnerability in Africa, using projections of future of climate vulnerability from the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) as well as indicators of past disaster incidence, household/community vulnerability, governance and political violence as well as demographic information. We suggest that maps of chronic vulnerability incorporating a variety of indicators provide a helpful advance for international relations scholars, as they are less reliant on heroic assumptions about changes in political and economic systems than either forecasting or scenario analysis.
operate. With Africa almost entirely dependent on rainfed agriculture, the uncertainty of future precipitation patterns is of special concern.
Against this backdrop of great social vulnerability and physical climate uncertainty, political scientists and the policy community have begun to explore the potential security consequences of climate change, describing it as a "stressor" or a "threat multiplier" with the potential to contribute to conflict and state failure.
1 Since most of political science is focused on explaining the past rather than predicting the future, scholars have looked to historic data on rainfall variability, disasters, temperature change, refugee movements (all expected effects of climate change) to try to get traction on the causal connections between climate phenomena and security outcomes.
Such an approach is rooted in the assumption of stationarity-the concept that the range of climate conditions for a given area occurs within a static envelop of variability that is defined by past extremes. However, as pronounced in a 2008 issue of the journal Science, "stationarity is dead": future climate means and extremes will be different than in the past. 2 The past, therefore, may be a poor indicator of how climate risks are likely to interact with social factors to generate disasters, instability, and conflict. Climate impacts analysts necessarily reject stationarity as a guide to future outcomes. Two complementary approaches used by this community are deterministic climate forecasts generated by complex physical models, and plausible "if-then" scenarios of future climate conditions upon which a range of plausible impacts scenarios can be developed. Some political scientists have begun adopting similar approaches to assessing the broad security implications of climate change, but the uncertainties in the underlying climate projections remain and there is a mismatch between the spatial and 1 (CNA Corporation 2007; Campbell et al. 2007 ). 2 (Milly 2008) .
temporal scales of available climate change projections and the questions political scientists pose.
Using Africa as a regional focus, this paper attempts to reconcile the scientific community's approach to climate change impacts analysis with the emerging approaches in political science for assessing the future social and political consequences of climate change.
This paper presents geo-referenced maps of sub-national climate vulnerability in Africa, using projections of future of climate vulnerability from the National Center for Atmospheric
Research (NCAR) as well as indicators of past disaster incidence, household/community vulnerability, governance and political violence as well as demographic information. We suggest that maps of chronic vulnerability incorporating a variety of indicators provide a helpful advance for international relations scholars, as they are less reliant on heroic assumptions about changes in political and economic systems than either forecasting or scenario analysis.
The first section summarizes what we know about climate change, the second what we know about climate change in Africa. The third section discusses the limits of three strategies political scientists have used to understand the significance of future climate change: historical analogues, forecasting, and scenario analysis. The fourth section presents our approach based on geo-referenced maps of sub-national climate vulnerability in Africa. By incorporating maps of future climate vulnerability from NCAR model output, we build on our previous work that used historic incidence of natural disasters and a variety of indicators of social, political and demographic vulnerability.
Section 1: What Do We Know About Climate Change
For the purposes of this paper, three important aspects of our knowledge of global climate change are important, including challenges to the notion of stationarity, the uncertainty of climate projections, and the importance of changes in the incidence of extreme weather events.
'Stationarity is Dead'
For most of human existence, the climate determined where and how we lived. Homo sapiens emerged sometime within the past half million years, during the great ice age that has gripped the Earth for past two million years. 3 Our species has mostly known a cold existence, punctuated by geologically brief warm periods (interglacials) every 100,000 years. Until a few thousand years ago, humans were perpetual nomads, moving and adapting their simple lives to dramatic climatic variations that occurred over decades to millennia. Then came "The Long
Summer," the current warm interglacial that geologists call the Holocene. At 16,000 years and counting, the Holocene has lasted much longer than most of the previous interglacials, and humans have capitalized on this extended period of global warmth. 4 Over the past 10,000 years, the global temperature has varied by only ±1°C around the long-term average. 5 Sea level rose rapidly for thousands years as the last glaciation ended, then stabilized between 6000 and 3000 years ago, offering permanent seaside locations to build ports and trading centers that would become great cities. Atmospheric circulation settled into consistent patterns that created breadbaskets where glaciers once stood. After two million years of nomadism, humans began to put down roots. Within a few millennia, humans transformed from nomads to modern industrialists. Our cities are permanent fortresses of
(McHenry 2009).
4 (Fagan 2004) . 5 (Jansen 2007 
Climate Projections are Uncertain
Although global climate models do a good job of mimicking the magnitude and gross spatial distribution of observed global temperature change on subcontinental to global scales, their performance is not as good for precipitation and performance generally degrades as 6 (Rockström 2009 ). 7 (Milly 2008) .
spatial scales become smaller. 8 Moreover, they may be systematically underestimating how responsive various components of the climate system are to the warming that has occurred so far. 9 Some aspects of climate that are changing more rapidly than models project include sea level rise, loss of Arctic sea ice, intensification of precipitation, poleward expansion of the dry tropics, and the loss of land-based ice from mountain glaciers and the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets.
10
There are several sources of uncertainty in model projections. First, the amount of greenhouse gases that humans will emit to the atmosphere in the future is unknown. Climate analysts have developed socioeconomic scenarios based on plausible alternative futures, but these are essentially elaborate guesses at what the future might hold and it is not possible to ascribe probability to any scenario. The range of greenhouse gas emissions scenarios employed is broad and accounts for much of the spread in model projections. 11 Changes in other future forcings are also unknown, such as the amounts of light-shading particles and methane in the atmosphere, volcanic eruptions, and changes in solar activity are unpredictable.
Another important contributor to uncertainty in model projections is the "response uncertainty," which refers to disagreement among models resulting from "the limited knowledge of how the climate system will react" to a given emissions scenario. 12 The IPCC Fourth Assessment report (AR4) employed around 20 global climate models in its projections of future climate. For a given climate-forcing scenario (i.e. a given amount of greenhouse gas emissions, solar activity, etc.), the inter-model spread among projections is large. For example, the uncertainty range of projected global warming from 1990 to 2100 for any given emissions 8 (Meehl 2007) . 9 (Engelhaupt 2007) . See also (Füssel 2009 ). 10 (Gulledge 2008b; Seidel 2008) . 11 (Meehl 2007) . 12 (Meehl 2007) .
scenario is on the order of 2°C (i.e. inter-model standard deviation of approximately ±1°C).
Considering that the G-8 have agreed on the aspirational goal of stabilizing the climate at not more than 2°C above the average preindustrial global temperature, an uncertainty range of ~2°C is significant. The quantified uncertainty range for model projections is simply based on the spread among different climate models across a range of emissions scenarios. Combining emissions uncertainty and response uncertainty, the full uncertainty range for projected warming to 2100 is 1.1-6.4°C, with a "likely" 13 range of 1.8-5.4°C.
14
The phrase "full uncertainty range" is a misnomer, since emissions and physical model response are not the only factors contributing to uncertainty. Another aspect that has not been fully explored is the equilibrium climate sensitivity, which quantifies the amount of warming that would result from a doubling of the amount of CO 2 in the atmosphere. The best estimate is about 3°C, but it could be as low as 1°C or it could be more than 10°C; the correct value is likely 15 to lie within the range of 2.0-4.5°C. 16 Because global climate models are almost always run with each model's best estimates of equilibrium climate sensitivity, the uncertainty for this parameter is not included in the uncertainty range for climate projections. Another form of uncertainty that is not included in projection ranges is "model structural uncertainty," which covers a host of unknown processes that may simply be missing from the models. For example, there are potential amplifying (positive) or dampening (negative) feedbacks that are too poorly understood to be included in models. One example is the potential release of billions of tons of carbon dioxide and methane from frozen soils (permafrost) in the north. 17 As the planet warms, these soils are beginning to thaw, releasing additionally greenhouse gases to the atmosphere 13 The IPCC defines "likely" as greater than 2:3 odds. 14 (CCSP 2008) . 15 The IPCC defines "likely" as greater than 2:3 odds. 16 (Meehl 2007, Box 10.2) . 17 (Walter et al. 2006) .
and amplifying the warming trend. How much and how quickly they will release their stores of carbon is presently unpredictable. Another positive feedback that is not completely integrated into models is the potential for plants and oceans to take up less carbon dioxide from the atmosphere in a warmer world. There may also be negative feedbacks that are missing from models, but the climate system appears to be particularly "blessed" with positive feedbacks, which entails heightened risk from a security assessment perspective. (Gulledge 2008b) . 19 (Meehl 2007, Box 10.2) . For similar discussions, see (Tebaldi et al. 2006 ) once in 40 years (a five-percentile event) event to every six years. Moreover, the new 1-in-40 year event would be significantly more intense (Fig. 1) .
20
For example, model experiments by Knutson and Tuleya (2004) (Knutson and Tuleya 2004) . 22 (IPCC 2007a; Niang, Nyong, and Clark 2007) . Africa's key vulnerabilities to climate change are in the areas of water availability, food security (agriculture and fisheries), health, coastal zones, and natural ecosystems and biodiversity.
23
The African continent warmed by about 1°C over the past century (Fig. 3) 23 (Niang, Nyong, and Clark 2007) . 24 (Baettig, Wild, and Imboden 2007) . • Drivers of climate change other than greenhouse gases are often ignored yet are important in Africa and much of the developing world. These include aerosols from burning wood and coal that alter atmospheric hydrology and block incoming solar radiation, changing the hydrology of the land surface. From the standpoint of climate impacts and preventing and adapting to them, these drivers of climate change are as important as greenhouse gases and are contributing strongly to current climate trends in Africa and Asia-much more so than in Europe and the Americas.
• Unlike for other continents with more developed economies, there is very little climate data for Africa. As a result, some important climate trends in Africa have been attributed to regional land use change only, but are likely tightly linked to large-scale climate phenomena, such as changes in sea surface temperatures or atmospheric aerosols. Increased Sahel drought is one such trend. 25 Climate data for Africa are particularly sparse in terms of observed impacts. The lack of data can be mistaken for a lack of climate-driven impacts, but obviously these are not the same and one should take care not to confuse the lack of detection for a lack of impacts.
26
The IPCC also identified several systems and sectors that are typical of Africa as being "especially affected" by climate change: mediterranean-type ecosystems, tropical rainforests, coastal mangroves and salt marshes, coral reefs, water resources in the dry tropics, lowland agricultural systems, low-lying coastal systems, and human health in populations with low adaptive capacity. It is no wonder, then that the IPCC also identified Africa generally and Africa's heavily populated river deltas as regions "especially affected" by climate change.
27
25 (Engelhaupt 2007) . 26 (Rosenzweig, Karoly, and Vicarelli 2008) . 27 (IPCC 2007a) .
Food security
The IPCC states that "Sub-Saharan Africa is … currently highly vulnerable to food insecurity. Drought conditions, flooding and pest outbreaks are some of the current stressors on food security that may be influenced by future climate change." Given that Africa already struggles with food security, it will not take much in the way of increased stress from climate change to undermine current development goals. There is a striking correspondence between population density and areas currently suitable for rain-fed agriculture in Africa. The amount of temperature and precipitation change projected by models for this region is large compared to the historical range of variability. 28 Because African societies are heavily dependent on rain-fed agriculture, they are more sensitive to climate changes in this region than wealthier societies that irrigate their crops. On average, the crop-producing region of Africa is projected to receive increased rainfall as a result of global warming. At first blush this projection would appear to be beneficial. Unfortunately, one of the most robust features of model projections is that year-to-year temperature, precipitation and drought extremes are likely to increase strongly, resulting in unpredictable crop yields from year to year. Increased flooding and storm intensity is likely, and even longer and more intense periods of drought are likely to occur in spite of the overall increase in precipitation, which is likely to fall in fewer, more intense events.
29
Higher temperatures alone are likely to reduce crop productivity in Africa, even in areas with sufficient rainfall. At low latitudes, crops already grow near or above their temperature optima, and further warming would reduce their growth. Similarly, livestock are sensitive to heat and milk and meat production are expected to decline with further warming. Barring 28 (Baettig, Wild, and Imboden 2007) . 29 (IPCC 2007a) .
adaptation, decreased agricultural production will not only increase hunger, but also decrease incomes of crop producers and raise food prices, further increasing the threat of hunger.
30
The threat of climate change to Africa's agriculture is not relegated to the distant future.
Growing seasons have already grown shorter in the Sahel, lowering crop yields. 31 Moreover, a recent study concluded that "late 20th-century anthropogenic Indian Ocean warming has probably already produced societally dangerous climate change by creating drought and social disruption in some of the world's most fragile food economies" in eastern and southern Africa.
According to the study's lead author, Chris Funk, "rainfall declines, combined with tremendous levels of rural poverty and vulnerability, produce undernourishment, malnutrition, child stunting and social disruption, hindering progress towards Millenium Development Goals." 32 By 2020, the IPCC projects that "in some [African] countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50%. Agricultural production, including access to food, in many African countries is projected to be severely compromised."
33
A large fraction of Africans rely on fish as their primary source of protein and fisheries are a major source of income to coastal communities and those situated around inland lakes.
34
Fish catch is declining already as a result of over-fishing, pollution, and other stresses that degrade aquatic systems. Hence, small changes in climate that alter aquatic ecosystems are likely to have deleterious effects on protein supply and income in Africa. In fact, climate change has already been linked to a well-documented decrease in the ecological productivity of Lake 30 (Niang, Nyong, and Clark 2007) . 31 (IPCC 2007c) . 32 (Kalaugher 2008) . 33 (IPCC 2007a) . 34 (Niang, Nyong, and Clark 2007) .
Tanganyika. 35 Hence, once again, the effects of climate change are not relegated to the distant future.
Water availability and flooding
By 2050, northern, southern, and parts of western Africa are likely to see moderate to extreme decreases in surface water flow (runoff) (Fig. 4) . 36 Projections are highly variable and less certain for the white areas in Fig. 4 . The area of southern Africa experiencing water shortages could increase from 9% today to 29% by 2050.
Decreased flow is projected for the Nile River, which supplies water for irrigation of virtually all crops in Egypt and its neighbors. One should bear in mind that 2050 is an arbitrary marker and is not the beginning of problems. Crop irrigation is disrupted when Nile water flow drops by 20%, a condition that has a 50% chance of becoming persistent by 2020. 37 The IPCC projects that 75 to 250 million Africans will be exposed to water stress by 2020.
38
Eastern Africa could see moderate to extreme increases in runoff by 2050 (Fig. 4) .
Increased precipitation in eastern Africa could lead to more wet-season flooding without 35 (O'Reilly et al. 2003; Rosenzweig, Karoly, and Vicarelli 2008) . 36 (Milly 2008; Niang, Nyong, and Clark 2007) . 37 (Niang, Nyong, and Clark 2007) . 38 (IPCC 2007c) . percent of Guinea's rice fields would be lost due to permanent flooding, assuming current sea level rise projections and no adaptation. Given the high probability that sea level rise has been systematically underestimated, it seems reasonable to favor the upper end of these estimated ranges. In Nigeria, about 6000 km 2 of agricultural land and hundreds of oil fields worth billions of dollars would be inundated by 1 meter of sea level rise. Barring protective measures, sea level rise will inundate coastal wetlands, negatively impacting fisheries.
Section III: Analogues, Forecasts, and Scenarios in Climate Security
From these diverse and still only partially understood physical consequences of climate change, scholars have sought to understand the likely affects on human health and livelihoods.
From these impacts, social scientists and policy analysts have tried to assess the potential security consequences of climate change, focusing mostly on the likelihood of armed conflict.
43 (Rahmstorf 2007; Rahmstorf et al. 2007 ). 44 (Gulledge 2008a; Rahmstorf 2007) .
They have sought to gain traction on the security dimension through a variety of strategies, including historical analogues, forecasting as well as scenario analysis. While the use of historical analogues is most clearly suited to traditional empirical research in the discipline of political science, it may have limited utility in addressing the future consequences of climate change.
Predictive, forecasting models and scenario analysis have less standing in the discipline but are attractive in that they directly address the limits of historically based research for novel problems. However, as this section notes, they too have their problems. 
Analogues

45
Given the tendency in the policy and advocacy community to link climate change and security outcomes through speculative conjecture and anecdotal information, the rigor of these quantitative studies is admirable. However, most of them can do little more than take the 45 For good examples, see (Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Hendrix and Glaser 2007; Nel and Righarts 2008; Thiesen, Holtermann, and Buhaug 2009; Levy et al. 2005) . For a critique of the policy literature and IPCC references to climate and security, see (Nordås and Gleditsch 2009 ). For a discussion of climate change, migration, and conflict, see (Raleigh and Jordan 2008; Gleditsch, Nordås, and Salehyan 2007 
Forecasting/Projections
The discipline of political science largely focuses on explanation of past events.
Prediction and projection have been employed more sparingly, though there are some prominent examples. Electoral models of U.S. presidential elections, for example, have sought predictive power using a few key variables. 49 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is renowned for 46 (Nordås and Gleditsch 2007, 633) . 47 (Busby 2008) . See also (Busby 2009a (Busby , 2009b Buhaug, Gleditsch, and Theisen 2008) . 48 (Buhaug, Gleditsch, and Theisen 2008, 36 generating predictions of international political developments for private clients using models that are somewhat proprietary.
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In the climate security arena, a couple of studies have sought to make more precise projections of future implications of their work based on historical analogues. I group these studies under the label of forecasting/projections, recognizing that scenario analysis, discussed below, is also sometimes bundled under the broader label of forecasting. 51 Here, I reference forecasting in a more narrow sense to encompass quantitative models of the future. There are at least two notable examples of such work in the climate security arena.
The first is the 2007 piece by Hendrix and Glaser in the special issue of Political
Geography. Like their peers, they use historical analogues-rainfall totals and rainfall change from the previous year-to determine whether or not those variables have historically been correlated with the onset of violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. The implication is that if climate change leads to changes in total rainfall and/or rainfall variability (and those have been found to be correlated with the onset of violent conflict), then climate change would make violent conflict more likely. As it is, they only found statistical support for their "trigger" variable of rainfall change being correlated with conflict onset in the period 1981-2002, rather than their "trend" variable of rainfall totals. The interesting extension Hendrix and Glaser made was to use climate models to ascertain the direction of future interannual rainfall variability as well as projected trends in long-run rainfall by the end of the 21 st century. Recognizing that their findings may reflect the particular operationalization of rainfall variability, they conclude:
"Our inability to detect widespread significant trends in rainfall triggers does not suggest a 50 For a profile of Bueno de Mesquita, see (Thompson 2009 ). 51 The website forecastingprinciples.com defines forecasting as "The field of forecasting is concerned with approaches to determining what the future holds. It is also concerned with the proper presentation and use of forecasts. The terms 'forecast,' 'prediction,' 'projection,' and 'prognosis' are typically used interchangeably." See the frequently asked questions.
future increase in civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa resulting from our measure of interannual rainfall variability." 52 In their piece, they merely sought to understand the potential direction of future change; unlike other approaches discussed below, they shied away from estimating the magnitude of effects on the future incidence of armed conflict.
As I discuss in section 4, this non-finding may be a result of their use of annual rather than seasonal rainfall data as well as the idiosyncrasies of the particular global circulation model they employed from NCAR that may be less accurate and possess less region-specific spatial resolution than would be desirable. Their work points to the challenges of extrapolating from uncertain physical models of climate change the future security consequences of climate change, even in a general sense of an up or down indicator in the incidence of conflict. In this case, their conservative judgment that they could not find strong patterns of future interannual rainfall variability reflected an appreciation of the uncertainties in the physical models of climate change as well as conflict models.
Other scholars have issued more specific quantitative projections of future conflict incidence resulting from climate change. For example, in their econometric work on temperature and conflict incidence/onset in sub-Saharan Africa, Burke et al. find a correlation between historic increases in temperature and conflict incidence/onset, over the period . Using projections of future temperature increases, the authors calculate that the subcontinent will experience a 54% increase in armed conflict by 2030. They then suggest if the rate of future civil wars is as deadly as historic civil wars have been, then the conflict-specific mortality from these future civil wars is likely to be 393,000 battle deaths. In so doing, they make a number of assumptions about future states of the world in terms of other indicators that are known to contribute to conflict. For example, they make assumptions about regime 52 (Hendrix and Glaser 2007, 710 and distance from the capital city. Perhaps the weakest element in this short piece is the thin causal account to explain the apparent correlation. While they attribute the connection to the effects on agriculture, the mechanism by which you get from declines in agricultural yields to armed conflict is under-specified. They suggest that the effects go through economic welfare, which is noted as one of the main contributors to conflict, but the causal chain from temperature increase to declining agricultural yields to economic decline to conflict onset remains fuzzy. The authors need to show in at least some of the country cases in their dataset that the implicit causal chain actually reflects a series of events that precipitated actual conflict.
54
For the purposes of this paper, the projections for conflict incidence and mortality are most salient. 55 While the paper notes that climate models have not yet converged around a 53 (Burke et al. 2009 ). While the authors employ a fixed-effects model to account for some invariant attributes of ethnicity, colonial past, geography, there are other political developments that likely changed during the study period that their model cannot account for. 54 This section has been informed by some unpublished critiques of the Burke et al. piece from Halvard Buhaug and Jack Goldstone. 55 Because their calculations assume no adaptation, the authors take pains to describe their work as "projections" rather than "predictions" (Burke et al. 2009, 20673) .
common set of findings for precipitation across the continent, the authors seek to obviate this difficulty by noting that there is more consistency across model specifications for temperature predictions. 56 The problem is that the strongest empirical findings in the climate security While predictive models for security outcomes remain an aspirational goal, the uncertainties of climate models, coupled with the poorly understood nature of the security consequences that could emanate from them, make the sorts of projections by Burke et al. potentially problematic.
Scenarios
Though sometimes grouped under the broader rubric of forecasting, scenario analysis provides an alternative approach for anticipating the future security consequences of climate change. Scenarios are narratives of a plausible future sequence of events, based on a set of assumptions. They are typically employed to force decision-makers in a corporate or policy setting to prepare for unexpected surprises that might not follow from current trends. They are thought to be especially helpful for problems characterized by high uncertainty. Unlike forecasting/projection models, scenarios analysis is much less numbers driven and relies more Given a narrative and set of assumptions, participants in a scenario planning exercise are typically asked about the driving forces that could have gotten them to that stage, how well their institution is designed to cope with such a situation, and what structural changes in the organization and broader policy environment might be facilitated to make the institution robust to this and other problems. In other settings, the participants themselves generate scenarios. In a group setting, different groups, often four of them, are frequently given derivatives of a single scenario, with alterations in the assumptions, leading to disparate sequences of events. The participants are asked to suspend disbelief about the nature of the assumptions and just react to the scenario they have before them, as if it could have happened.
59
Scenarios have limited acceptance in political science, with wider acceptance in the business community. Scenarios are ubiquitous in the climate science realm, where projections of future climate change are predicted on different assumptions about economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions over course of the 21st century. In the climate security community, scenarios have some limited application, particularly in the policy world. Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, in a widely cited piece that was commissioned by the Defense Department's Office of Net Assessment, tried to assess the consequences for U.S. national security in the event of abrupt climate change. This is a class of phenomena that scientists believe are low probability events that could possibly occur to switch off circulation of the Gulf Stream and induce the onset of another ice age, with European temperatures most likely to plummet. 60 59 (Garvin and Levesque 2005; Schoemaker 1991; Ogilvy and Schwartz 2004) . 60 (Schwartz and Randall 2003) .
Schwartz is one of the leading exponents of scenario analysis, having pioneered the practice in the corporate realm for Shell.
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One of us was involved in another effort by the Center for A New American Security (CNAS) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) which examined three scenarios of the future to assess the security consequences of climate change in the event of expected or severe climate change by 2040 or catastrophic climate change by 2100. In that study, what made a scenario worth considering was "plausibility" rather than "probability." As Gulledge wrote in that piece:
Given the uncertainty in calculating climate change, and the fact that existing estimates may be biased low at this time, plausibility is an important measure of future impacts. Under this umbrella of plausibility, potential changes that the IPCC or other assessments may characterize as improbable are considered plausible here if significant uncertainty persists regarding their probability… 62 A third application to the climate security arena is provided by the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Report, which specified four future states of the world, several of which had to do with climate change and energy systems.
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Scenario analysis provides an important corrective to overreliance on contemporary states of the world for information and guidance about the future. Purposively identifying potential surprises and thinking through the consequences of unlikely events can help decisionmakers prepare for rare, unlikely events. However, as Wright and Goodwin point out, a scenario may not actually shake people out of current mindsets and merely serve to reinforce them. Moreover, scenarios may fixate the minds of participants on those situations to make 61 See, for example, http://www.shell.com/home/content/aboutshell/our_strategy/shell_global_scenarios/what_are_scenarios/what_are_s cenarios_30102006.html 62 (Gulledge 2007, 35) . 63 See http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2020_project.html them appear more likely than they actually are. 64 Moreover, as Busby pointed out in his work, scenarios that rely on the most uncertain and least likely effects of climate change to build a case for security connections may be less useful than studies that take conservative estimates of the most probable consequences of climate change. If one can identify clear connections between climate change and security outcomes using restrictive assumptions where critics still question the basic science of the problem, then the question becomes is it better overstate or understate the significance of a problem. 65 In terms of assessing the likely security consequences of climate change, it is unclear how to judge between the quality of competing narratives.
Having taken part in a number of scenario exercises, we have found that participants often have trouble suspending disbelief and spend as much time questioning the likelihood that we will end up in the state of the world in the scenario.
Section IV: Vulnerability Assessments and Africa
Vulnerability assessments are another approach to evaluate the potential security consequences of climate change, allowing analysts to map the sources of vulnerability spatially.
Vulnerability is frequently identified with susceptibility to losses. According to the IPCC's Fourth Assessment, vulnerability is defined as "the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate change and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity." 66 Such a definition obscures the important social and political determinants of vulnerability that may dramatically exacerbate the human consequences of extreme weather or seismic events, like a 64 (Wright and Goodwin 2009) . 65 (Busby 2008 Hurricane Katrina or the 2010 Haitian earthquake. In this section, I review the rationale behind vulnerability assessments and provide a brief review of our methods before discussing the results.
Why Vulnerability Assessments
In our approach, we capture a static snapshot of long-run vulnerability, what best approximates what Burg called "chronic vulnerability" rather than emergent, dynamic processes. 67 Other organizations, like the World Food Programme and the United Nations, have parallel efforts to document and map emergent vulnerability to drought and famines.
Relying on near real-time data on precipitation, food supplies, crop yields, market prices, and other indicators, these vulnerability diagnoses have a shorter shelf-life and are used for shortterm prediction and resource mobilization.
68
We see a different value-added in our approach which utilizes a basket of sources of vulnerability-physical, household/community, governance and political violence, and demographic. 69 Rather than try to predict a narrowly defined security outcome-violent conflict-or create a suite of scenarios that observers may challenge as unlikely, we aim to identify the persistent sources of vulnerability from diverse perspectives that may make particular places less able to cope with climate change. The aim is not to just show that Ethiopia is vulnerable to climate change at the country level but which parts of Ethiopia are vulnerable and why. Our approach uses a weighted index of four baskets to spatially represent subnational vulnerability using the map-making properties of ArcGIS software. We are somewhat 67 (Burg 2008 agnostic about what form the security consequences might take; our approach enables analysts to narrow down the areas of concern, both for fieldwork to "ground truth" and test the sources of vulnerability developed from datasets as well as to guide policy interventions to the priority areas of key concern.
Brief Survey of Methods
Like the historical analogue work, our vulnerability assessments in their first incarnation largely relied on historic data -on disaster incidence, on household and community vulnerability (using health and education indicators), on governance and political violence (using statistics from the World Bank and other outlets), and on population. We weighted each basket equally, and each basket had a number of sub-indicators indicative of underlying phenomena that we thought relevant to a country's overall vulnerability (see Table I ).
While sub-national level data was not available for every indicator, our aim was to be broadly representative of the diverse sources of vulnerability and the natural routes of response to the physical manifestation of climate change, beginning first at the individual and community level proceeding to the governmental level where local capacities for self-protection are overcome by the severity of the climate event. To make these indicators and baskets comparable, we converted each into quintiles of relative vulnerability, such that countries and sub-national units in Africa are compared against African averages. As a consequence, a country or sub-national unit might appear positive because it ranks highly within Africa, though its status relative to the rest of the world might still remain poor. Our first comprehensive maps of climate vulnerability yielded the following map (FIGURE 7):
FIGURE 7
The map shows Western Ethiopia, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Somalia, parts of Nigeria, southern Sudan, the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo, parts of the Gold Coast, among other areas to be the most vulnerable, on the basis of historic and contemporary data.
The extension for this paper, the first of many, explicitly encompasses future climate change by using model output that is available in ArcGIS. We aim to substitute the incidence of historic disasters with projections of future climate change to see how different our representations of future vulnerability are from the past. To the extent areas vulnerable historically are also vulnerable in the future, we can have more confidence where to guide fieldwork and resources.
Like our previous paper, we see both efforts as a proof of concept to be refined with better data and methods as time passes. Our aim in this paper was to make use of readily In the meantime, to demonstrate the promise of this approach, we are able to generate continent-wide projections for seasonal precipitation change and rainfall variability for the A1B high growth emissions scenario for the year 2030, compared to 1990 (both 2030 and 1990 rely on twenty year rolling averages, 2020-2039 and 1980-1999 respectively) . Whereas Hendrix and
Glaser assessed changes in total rainfall, compared contemporary rainfall patterns with those in 2100, we sought more short-term projections, based on time horizons that policymakers might consider to be more relevant. We also extended our coverage continent wide rather than subSaharan Africa. In addition, we adjusted our rainfall totals to reflect the different zones of high seasonal rains (see Figure 8 ). This was important because to try to closely calibrate rainfall to the planting season as it is currently known. Even as the planting season changes in terms of start date and duration, it is also important to know if the rains are projected to be fall in the same quantities and the same interannual variation. If we were to use annual data, we might imagine that rainfall could go up in some months and down in others, potentially looking like a stable pattern over the course of the year. We believed that changes in rainfall during the planting season, either in terms of total quantity or variability, would be more disruptive to agricultural planning and food security, than annual rainfall data.
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70 In Figure 10 , we calculate the percent change between the seasonal variation in rainfall in the period 2020-2039 and the variation in the period 1980-1999. Variation here is calculated in terms of the sum of the squared seasonal deviations from the 20-year mean. The percent change in variation therefore can go up (less stable), remain the same, or go down (become more stable).
Figure 8
When we combine this regional seasonal rainfall map with projected changes in rainfall and rainfall variation, we generate two maps (Figures 9 and 10 ). (In figure 9 , which depicts changes in total rainfall between 1990 and 2030, we exclude areas of North Africa below the Maghreb and above the Sahel that receive little rainfall).
FIGURE 9 FIGURE 10
Our changes in total rainfall map ( Figure 9 ) suggests North Africa, the Congo Basin and the western Cape are particularly vulnerable to declines in rainfall, with the Sahel region experiencing an increase in the amount of seasonal rainfall as well as portions of east and southeast Afirca. Figure 10 suggests that central and southwestern Africa as well as northern
FIGURE 12: Tebaldi Rainfall Change Projection
From these maps of rainfall changes and variation, we then generated new maps of overall vulnerability. Rather than make heroic assumptions about rates of change in health and education as well as patterns of governance and political violence, we take contemporary values for two of the three remaining baskets of vulnerability. We do not believe continent wide extrapolations for such processes are likely to be, at this stage, much more than speculation.
Improvements in health and education are likely to be uneven within, let alone between countries. We thought it deeply problematic to try to impose a uniform set of assumptions about rates of change. For other phenomena, such as population, for which demographic information and models of change have an established track record, we were open to refinement, using projections from the GRUMP database.
We calculated a new model of future physical exposure combining (1) low elevation coastal zones (2) changes in total rainfall and (3) changes in rainfall variation ( Figure 13 ). We find that on the basis of these indicators generated by this particular climate model that the central western and southern part of Africa around the DRC is most vulnerable to climate change.
Figure 13
We then calculate total vulnerability by substituting the exposure data for the natural disaster data (Figure 14) . In this context, the new map of overall vulnerability is not strictly comparable with Figure 7 since it only reflects a couple of indicators of precipitation and one for low elevation coastal zones. Nonetheless, the patterns for these particular indicators suggest future exposure will be concentrated in the DRC, Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola, and in pockets through West Africa.
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Figure 14
72 The patterns, taking into account, projected future population density in 2015 are similar. Results upon request. political/governance variables including a country's crisis history, the degree of violence in its neighborhood, and its capacity. Of particular interest is the final physical indicator, water scarcity, which would reflect the importance we might attach to countries like Egypt with low total rainfall but reliant on runoff or river systems with distant origins. Because our rainfall data excludes the low rainfall areas in the Sahara extending over to Egypt, we are likely to exclude an area of high population and potentially high climate vulnerability. 73 We certainly need a corrective for Egypt with additional indicators of future climate vulnerability.
Other related refinements are likely important. For example, we classify countries that are projected to have the most negative rainfall change (and the greatest positive percentage change in variation) as the most vulnerable. However, a country that experiences an increase in rain above historic means may fare just as poorly as a country that gets too little rain. Beyond extension of this work to multi-model ensembles, river systems/water availability and more nuanced accounts of rainfall change, we therefore aim to collect data on extreme weather events.
Tebaldi has generated model output of extreme precipitation and temperature events for GCMs; this is an important template for the regional climate models we hope to develop. 74 Buja, based on Tebaldi's study, has represented a number of projections for 2030 for extreme weather events in Africa. While promising, these require, some manipulation to import into 73 (Levy et al. 2008) . 74 (Tebaldi et al. 2006 ).
ArcGIS. Nonetheless, some of the patterns are striking. In Figure 15 , two extreme weather event projections for 1990-2030 for Africa from Buja's visualization of Tebaldi's work are presented. These show concentrations of heat waves in West Africa along the Morocco coast with heavy precipitation events in the area as well as along the eastern coast of southern Africa.
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FIGURE 15: Heat Waves and Precipitation Intensity
In additions to these additions to our overall vulnerability approach are a host of others including incorporation of ethnic marginalization, expanded sub-national data on household and community vulnerability, as well as indicators of the strategic importance of particular places, based on the location of oil wells, mines, etc. Finally, we aim to subject this entire model to a range of sensitivity analyses to see how much the final maps change with different assumptions.
To the extent that these models are transparent about methods, including the deficiencies in the sources of data, we hope to avoid some of the more sharp criticism that has 75 (Buja and Arblaster 2006) .
been directed towards predictive models and scenarios. Given that predictive models (or projections) like the Burke et al. piece base their findings on global circulation models that may not adequately capture regional dynamics in Africa either historically or prospectively, we should question whether or not their future projections of temperature and precipitation are likely adequate. Moreover, since such approaches rely on assumptions about the rate of economic growth and political development for their estimates of conflict incidence and battle deaths, we should be particularly skeptical of specific numerical projections for security outcomes, particularly where the causal mechanisms are still only loosely fleshed out and are not accompanied by process-tracing of historical cases. In employing vulnerability assessments that get at the diverse sources of sub-national susceptibility to losses from climate change, we hope our maps and methodology prove to be useful spatial representations to guide considerations of climate and security in the scholarly community as well as among policymakers.
